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CASENOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Rape-Cautionary Instruction in Sex Of-
fense Trial Relating Prosecutrix's Credibility to the Nature of
the Crime Charged is No Longer Mandatory; Discretionary
Use Is Disapproved. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538
P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
Defendant was convicted of rape, oral copulation, and attempted
sodomy in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.' The case against
him rested predominantly on the testimony of his adult victim,2
partially corroborated as to identity by a scratch on defendant's
forehead,3 and further substantiated by defendant's "if I did it I was
drunk" admission to the police.'
The defendant appealed alleging error by the trial judge for failing
to give the mandatory cautionary instruction that:5
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which
is easily made and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person
accused is innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female
person named in the information with caution.
The California Supreme Court held that because the defendant was
entitled to the cautionary instruction the trial judge had committed
1. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 870, 538 P.2d 247, 251, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
123 (1975). There were two trials. The first resulted in a hung jury and "involved substantially
the same evidence as the second." Id. The supreme court, however, noted "important differ-
ences in the evidence at the two trials." Id. In the second trial the victim was more specific
as to the strength of illumination which allowed her to identify her assailant. In the first trial
defendant's "if ! did it I was drunk" admission was not in evidence. At the second hearing,
the victim refused to answer questions as to her past sexual conduct which in the first trial
had been examined'in "some detail." Id., 538 P.2d at 251-52, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 123.24. Finally,
the mandatory cautionary instruction was given in the first trial, but in the second trial was
not given, id., 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124, because the trial judge "considered it
demeaning of the victim in the instant case," id. at 866, 538 P.2d at 249, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
121, and "noted that its compulsory use had not been authoritatively reexamined for de-
cades." Id. at 872, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
2. Id. at 866-70, 538 P.2d at 249-51, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 121-23.
3. Id. at. 868, 873, 538 P.2d at 250, 253, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 122, 125.
4. Id. at 869, 870, 5:18 P.2d at 250, 251, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 122, 123.
5. Id. at 871, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124. citing CAL. JURY INSrRaUcr1N CiuM.
No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970).
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error in refusing to give it. Such error, however, was not prejudi-
cial.7 For the future, the supreme court prohibited mandatory appli-
cation' of the cautionary instruction, and disapproved its discretion-
ary use as it was customarily worded? The defendant's conviction
was affirmed.'"
The cautionary instruction should be regarded as having two
parts." The first is a general observation commenting on the charac-
ter of the crime charged, 2 for example; "rape is easy to charge but
difficult to defend against." The second is a conclusion prescribing
caution which comments on the credibility of a witness. "Therefore,
you are required to examine with caution the prosecutrix's testi-
mony" is a typical formulation. Although the two parts together
constitute the cautionary instruction, the cautionary element is only
the second part, the need for caution being grounded upon the ob-
servation made in the first part.
The origin of the cautionary instruction for rape and other sex
offenses is attributed to the seventeenth century writings of Sir
Matthew Hale." The first part of the instruction is derived from
Lord Hale's observation: 4
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and
impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it
is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
The "prescription of caution" is taken from the conclusion of Lord
Hale's discussion of proof of rape:9  -
I only mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials
of offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease
6. 14 Cal. 3d at 872, 538 P.2d at 252-53, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
7. Id. at 873, 538 P.2d at 253, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
8. Id. at 877, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
9. Id. at 882, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
10. Id. at 873, 538 P.2d at 253, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
11. The court suggests such a division in its discussion of Sir Matthew Hale's writings on
proof of rape. See id. at 874, 538 P.2d at 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
12. Traditionally this part ot the instruction was considered a comment on the facts, but
it is now regarded as a comment on the character of the crime charged. See note 60 infra and
accompanying text.
1-3. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 873, 538 P.2d 247, 254, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 126 (1975).
14. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1680).
15. Id. at 636.
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be imposed upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the
offense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indigna-
tion, that they are over hastily carried to the conviction of the person accused
thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of malicious and false wit-
nesses.
According to the supreme court, Lord Hale cast this need for
caution in the context of three propositions: "[T]hat otherwise
incompetent, infant witnesses should be allowed to address the jury,
that he [Hale] had personally witnessed the malicious prosecution
of fabricated allegations of rape, and that rape in general aroused
passions ill-suited to fair adjudication."'" The credibility of a wit-
ness, however, was still to be judged by the circumstances of the
alleged crime and the witness's narration. 7
Hale's instruction was introduced into California in the 1856 case
of People v. Benson. i" The only convicting evidence was the accusa-
tory testimony of the thirteen year old prosecutrix.11 The defendant
was found guilty of rape,20 but on appeal the supreme court reversed
and ordered a new trial remarking:2'
From the days of Lord Hale to the present time, no case has ever gone to the
jury, upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, unsustained by facts and
circumstances corroborating it, without the Court warning them of the dan-
ger of a conviction on such testimony.
Thus California adopted Hale's charge in a rape case in which the
prosecutrix was a minor, her uncorroborated testimony was the only
convicting evidence, and the court viewed that evidence as
improbable.12
Early in the twentieth century, California law required that upon
16. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 877, 538 P.2d 247, 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
128 (1975).
17. Id.
18. 6 Cal. 221 (1856).
19. Id. at 223.
20. Id. at 222.
21. Id. at 223.
22. Id.
The case before us is supported alone by the evidence of the prosecutrix, a young
ignorant girl, thirteen years of age, and is so improbable of itself as to warrant us in
the belief that the verdict was more the result of prejudice or popular excitement, than
the calm and dispassionate conclusion upon the facts by twelve men sworn to discharge
their duty faithfully.
Id. at 223-24.
1976]
422 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV
request cautionary instructions were to be given in rape cases "ei-
ther when the prosecutrix is a child of tender years, or when her
testimony is uncorroborated." ' 3 The first part of the instruction,
which observes how easy it is to charge rape and comments on the
diffculty of defense, was subsequently discarded as an impermissi-
ble comment by a trial judge on the facts of the case.24 Though not
cited in the decision, the court presumably relied on the state con-
stitutional prohibition against judicial comment upon the facts.2"
In 1934 California amended its constitution to permit the trial
judge broader discretion by allowing him to comment on the evi-
dence, testimony, and credibility of any wftness.s With the consti-
tutional impediment removed, the stage was set for resurrection of
the first half of Hale's instruction and an expansion of the use of the
cautionary charge to protect defendants with whom Lord Hale never
purported to be concerned.
Six years after the amendment, Benson's version of the Hale in-
struction was extended to an other-than-rape sex offense 7 in which
the infant complainant's testimony was corroborated; 8 and it was
23. People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280, 298, 203 P. 440, 448 (1921). The trial court's
failure to give cautionary instruction cannot constitute reversible error if the defendant has
failed to request the instruction. People v. Rangod, 112 Cal. 669, 672, 44 P. 1071, 1072 (1896).
Rangod also suggests that when the prosecutrix's testimony, is. materially corroborated by
other evidence it is improper to give the cautionary instruction because "such [an] instruc-
tion might well [be] construed by the jury as an intimation from the judge that he did not
regard the corroboration as material or worthy of consideration .. Id.
24. People v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 160, 196 P. 47, 50 (1921).
The statements that it is particularly difficult for a defendant to clear himself of such
a charge, that no charge is more easily made or more difficult to disprove, and that
the two parties are usually the only witnesses to the act are statements of fact, not of
law. . . .[T]hey are not proper in an instruction to the jury, though they may be
entirely harmless. Some of these remarks have been included in instructions given and
which have not been condemned as error in the above-cited cases. But the court is not
bound to give an instruction containing them, and error cannot be predicated upon
the refusal to do so.
Id. (citations omitted). This statement implies that Anthony nonetheless regarded precedent
as authorizing the second part of the instruction which cautions the jury to examine with care
the testimony of the complainant.
25. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1879), "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to
matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law." Id.
26. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1934).
27. People v. Lucas,, 16 Cal. 2d 178, 105 P.2d 102 (1940). The defendant was charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Id. at 180, 105 P.2d at 103.
28. The complainant's testimony was corroborated to the extent that the defendant
owned a car matching complainant's description, admitted knowing complainant, and admit-
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suggested that the instruction be required in all such cases. 9 The
suggestion was adopted in People v. Putnam3° where a minor's accu-
sation of lewd and lascivious acts was held to require the trial court
to give the cautionary instruction sua sponte.3' Because California
has no corroboration requirement for conviction of sex crimes, 3
Putnam reasoned that a counter-weight was needed to protect the
accused. Paradoxically, the complainant's testimony in Putnam
was corroborated. 4
The next development was to shield the defendant from his adult
accusers. In 1951 the court supplied cautionary protection to a de-
fendant accused by two adult prosecutrices, one a rape victim and
the other a victim of assault with intent to' rape.35 Thus, over the
course of a century, the four factors" in Benson which had induced
California to import the Hale charge were expanded beyond recogni-
ted taking complainant to the cinema and on several occasions giving him theater passes.
Id.
29. Id. "We are firmly of the view that in all cases of this character a defendant should
be afforded the benefit of a cautionary instruction as was here requested . Id.
30. 20 Cal. 2d 885, 129 P.2d 367 (1942).
31. Id. at 891-92, 129 P.2d at 370.
32. See People v. Fleming, 94 Cal. 308, 310, 29 P. 647 (1892); People v. Benson, 6 Cal.
221, 223 (1856) (by implication); People v. Stevenson, 275 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650, 80 Cal. Rptr.
392, 395 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970); People v. Raich, 26 Cal. App. 286, 287,
146 P. 907, 908 (1915). See also 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 342 n.1 (3d ed. 1940); Note,
The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1366-67 n.16
(1972).
33. 20 Cal. 2d at 891-92, 129 P.2d at 370.
The rule permitting a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting
witness is necessary to protect the public but it needs a counterweight to protect the
accused. The policy that requires the court to instruct of its own motion on the law
relative to corroboration imposes a corresponding duty to give cautionary instructions
... [A] necessary safeguard against injustice is a warning to view such accusations
cautiously.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus Putnam adds to the Lucas rule a mandate that trial judges must
give the cautionary instruction when an infant complains of sexual abuse and thereby elimi-
nates the Rangod request by defendant requirement. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.
3d 864, 875-76, 538 P.2d 247, 255. 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 127 (1975); People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d
34, 40, 237 P.2d 1, 4 (1951). For use of the no-corroboration-necessary-to.convict rule to reason
to the opposite conclusion, see State v. Fedderson, - Mich. 230 N.W.2d 510,
515 (1975).
34. In Putnam the infant's complaint was corroborated by his mother's testimony. 20 Cal.
2d at 887, 129 P.2d at 368. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 878-79, 538 P.2d
247, 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119. 129 (1975).
35. People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 36, 237 P.2d 1, 5 (1951).
36. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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tion. The cautionary charge was mandatory for any sexual offense
regardless of whether the evidence was considered improbable. It
was also immaterial whether the defendant was accused by infant
or adult, and corroboration of the complainant's testimony did not
excuse the requirement for cautionary instruction.
Curiously, the rule of mandatory cautionary instruction often af-
forded but slight protection. When the trial judge failed or refused
to give the instruction the error resulting from his breach of the
mandatory rule was considered harmless, unless there was a reason-
able probability that the instruction would have resulted in a ver-
dict more favorable to the defendant.37 Only in Putnam was the
absence of the instruction prejudicial,"S not because of the failure to
charge caution, but because the complaining witness's testimony
was regarded as improbable.39 However, the protection of the cau-
tionary charge should not be regarded as illusory insofar as it is
conceivable that acquitals were prompted at trial by the giving of
the cautionary instruction.
People v. Rincon-Pineda"l disavowed the mandatory nature of the
cautionary instruction for two reasons, one involving due process
developments in criminal law,4" and the other concerning recent
empirical studies on sex crimes in general and rape in particular. 3
Observing that the virtually defenseless accused of Lord Hale's day
is now armed with-the "potent accouterments of due process,"'" the
court concluded that the mandatory instruction omitted by the trial
37. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). When. the evidence
clearly points to the defendant's guilt, or when there is ample corroboration of the complain-
ant's testimony, or when other factors indicate that the defendant received a fair trial, failure
to give the mandatory cautionary instruction is not prejudicial. People v. Merriam, 66 Cal.
2d 390, 395, 426 P.2d 161,164, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1967). "Under this standard, a finding that
failure to give the instruction was harmless error has been far more the rule than the excep-
tion." People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 872, 538 P.2d 247, 253, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
125 (1975) (citation omitted).
38. 20 Cal. 2d at 892, 129 P.2d at 371.
39. Id. at 892-93, 129 P.2d at 371. "In view of the circumscribed extent of the acts alleged
and the inconsistencies in the witnesses' [complainant's] testimony, it is doubtful whether
the same verdict would have been rendered had the cautionary instruction been given." Id.
at 893, 129 P.2d at 371.
40. See notes 1, 39 supra.
41. 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
42. Id. at 877-78, 538 P.2d at 256-57, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
43. Id. at 879-82, 538 P.2d at 256-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128-31.
44. Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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judge has outlived its usefulness45 and offers today but superfluous
protection against malicious and fabricated prosecution.4" The court
then analyzed the validity of the first part of the instruction by
reviewing contemporary studies of rape and other sex offense prose-
cutions. 7 Using persuasively the statistical data of these studies, the
court reduced the assertion that sex crimes are easy to charge and
difficult to defend against to mere conventional wisdom. On the
contrary, when police discretion and trial tactics of defense counsel
are considered, it would appear more accurate to instruct that sex
crimes are difficult to charge and easy to defend.48 The complain-
ant's plight at the station house attempting to convince the police
to pursue the charge, and the public embarrassment and humilia-
tion encountered confronting both police and defense counsel4"
frequently cause the sexually assaulted victim to wonder who is on
trial.5" The court decided that "[s]ince it does not in fact appear
that the accused perpetrators of sex offenses in general and rape in
45. Id. at 877, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
46. Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
47. The court discussed the following studies: M. AMm, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971);
G. ASTOR, THE CHARGE IS RAPE (1974); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE (1974); CAL. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY IN CAL., 1972, Adult Prosecution Reference Tables (1973); FBI, Uniform Crime Re-
ports, 1973 (1974); Amir, Victim Precipitated Rape, 58 CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 493 (1967); Le-
Grand, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1973); Note,
The Victim In A Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973);
Comment, Police Discretion And The Judgment That A Crime Has Been Committed-Rape
In Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277 (1968); Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement:
Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
48. 14 Cal. 3d at 880-81, 538 P.2d at 258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31. Two other factors
which the court notes in this regard are: (1) forcible rape has the highest rate of acquittal or
dismissal of the FBI's form "violent crimes" (murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault); and (2) rape is "grossly" under-reported. Id. at 879-81, 538 P.2d at 257-59, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 129-31.
49. Note, The Victim In A Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
335, 347-51 (1973). See also People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 880-81, 538 P.2d 247,
258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 130-31 (1975).
50. 14 Cal. 3d at 871, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
Given the overall context of the first trial, there was as much truth as irony in a slip
of the tongue by the arresting officer during his testimony at that trial. When asked
to identify several photographs of the victim showing the injuries inflicted by her
assailant, the officer replied: "In these photographs is a picture of the defendant in
different positions." The victim too seemed to feel that it was she who had been the
defendant in the first trial.
Id.; see Note, The Victim In A Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
335, 351 (1973).
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particular are subject to capricious conviction by inflamed tribunals
of justice . . .the requirement of a cautionary instruction in all
such cases is a rule without a reason." '5'
The court disapproved of discretionary use of the conventional
cautionary instruction as inappropriate "in any context"5 for three
reasons. First, the instruction was disfavored because defendants
accused of sex offenses no longer suffer any special prejudice.53 Sec-
ondly, the charge was regarded as performing "no just function,
since criminal charges involving sexual conduct are no more easily
made or harder to defend against than many other classes of
charges, and those who make such accusations should be deemed
no more suspect in credibility than any other class of complain-
ants."54 Finally, the first part of the instruction was removed from
the scope of the trial court's discretion by characterizing it as a
comment on the "nature of the crime. 55
The court's first objection to discretionary use of the charge was
based on the reasoning developed in rejecting the rule of mandatory
application. 56 However appropriate this reasoning is to invalidate a
rule of decisional law, it is inadequate to support a limitation of the
discretion conferred by the state constitution on the trial court. To
the extent that a fabricated or malicious accusation could be made,
however infrequently that may occur, the trial court should be free
to exercise its constitutional prerogative to comment on facts. The
supreme court's disapproval of the charge on this ground amounts
to a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the State of
California, and implies that the trial court is incompetent to admin-
ister the charge properly. 7
The objection that the instruction discriminates unjustly among
classes of charges and classes of complainants could have been rem-
51. 14 Cal. 3d at 882, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
52. Id., 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 883, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132. But cf. Comment, Police Discretion
And The Judgment That A Crime Has Been Committed-Rape In Philadelphia, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 277, 277-78 (1968).
55. 14 Cal. 3d at 885 n.9, 882 n.6, 538 P.2d at 262 n.9,-260 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 134 n.9,
132 n.6.
56. See text accompanying notes 41-51 supra.
57. See People v. Cady, 267 Cal. App. 2d 189, 194, 72 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (1968) (concur-
ring opinion).
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edied equally well by exterding its application to all criminal
charges and complaining witnesses." Thus, this criticism, however
compelling it might have been in the context of the mandatory rule,
adds no persuasive force to the decision to disapprove discretionary
use.
The third objection is the most sound, but was presented in a
conclusive fashion without supporting reasoning. The court labeled
the instruction's observation that a sex offense is easy to charge but
difficult to defend against as a comment on the "nature of the
crime," and announced that such comment was impermissible."
There was no explanation of why this observation, which for so long
had been considered a comment on the facts, 0 was now regarded as
a comment on the "nature of the crime," nor was there any enlight-
enment as to why a comment on the "nature of the crime" was or
should be impermissible.6 '
While it would have been helpful had the court developed this
third objection more fully, the criticism is nonetheless valid. The
term "comment on the nature of the crime" describes the first part
of the instruction more accurately than does the former term "com-
ment on the facts." The assertion that a sex offense is easily charged
and defended against with difficulty is a generalization whose accu-
racy will vary with each particular case. It should therefore be con-
58. However, if the instruction is a bad one, as Rincon-Pineda appears to consider the
conventional one, 14 Cal. 3d at 879-83, 538 P.2d at 257-60, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129-32, then it is
better to get rid of it entirely than to allow it to be extended to all criminal cases.
59. 14 Cal. 3d at 885 n.9, 882 n.6, 538 P.2d at 262 n.9, 260 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 134 n.9,
132 n.6.
60. In People v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 196 P. 47 (1921) the court disapproved of the first
part of the instruction because it was a charge on the facts of the case. Id. at 160, 196 P. at
50. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1879), upon which Anthony presumably relied, was amended
in 1934 to permit trial judges to comment on the evidence, testimony, and credibility of any
witness. People v. Lucas, 16 Cal. 2d 178, 105 P. 2d 102 (1940) expressly read the 1934 amend-
ment as "authorizing a trial court to comment on the facts," and found the first part of the
instruction permissible. Id. at 182, 105 P.2d at 104. Thus while Anthony's criticism of the
cautionary instruction is no longer followed, its characterization of the first part of the in-
struction as a comment on the facts of the case has been consistently accepted until Rincon-
Pineda.
61. The court found the instruction impermissible because it "focusses on the character
of the crime rather than the nature of the evidence," 14 Cal. 3d at 882 n.6, 538 P.2d at 260
n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132 n.6, implying that giving the charge is an abuse of the trial judge's
discretion to comment on the evidence, testimony, and credibility of witnesses, CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 10 (1966) renumbering CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1934).
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sidered as a broad statement on the nature of the crime rather than
a comment on specific facts.
. The court is correct in forbidding such a general' comment be-
cause it could interfere with the jury's task of trying fact and credi-
bility. An instruction advising caution by relating credibility of the
witness to the nature of the crime provides the jury with imprecise
direction for evaluating the testimony of the witness whose truthful-
ness has been cast in doubt. The instruction speaks only of the ease
of complaint and the difficulty of defense. It invites the danger that
the jury will interpret the need for caution as the judge's expression
of incredulity and substitute his apparent distrust of the testimony
for their own independent judgment.2 This danger threatens the
jury's exclusive domain as trier of credibility and thus ironically
jeopardizes the defendant's right to a jury trial.
Should the trial judge wish to comment on the credibility of any
witness, he must do so, the court directed, "in terms of the evidence
adduced at trial, i. e., inconsistent statements, lack of character for
veracity, bias, etc."63 Consequently, the second part of the instruc-
tion, the comment on credibility, is permissible when joined with
comment on the "nature of the evidence." 4
A cautionary instruction proposed by amicus curiae would pre-
scribe caution when "the case against the defendant 'substantially
rests upon the testimony of the complaining witness' uncorrobor-
ated by 'substantial evidence.' "65 It would seem that this suggestion
relates the credibility of the complainant to the general "nature of
the evidence," but the court rejected6 the suggestion neglecting to
explain its demerits. Even if only intuitive, the rejection was cor-
rect. An instruction tying credibility with the general nature of the
evidence contains the same deficiencies as the character of the
crime charge. It fails to apprise the jury of the cause of the judge's
62. Cf. People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885, 889, 129 P.2d 367, 369 (1942); People v. Rangod,
112 Cal. 669, 672, 44 P. 1071, 1072 (1896); People v. Cady, 267 Cal. App. 2d 189, 193, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 772, 775 (1968) (concurring opinion). I
63. 14 Cal. 3d at 885 n.9, 538 P.2d at 262 n.9, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 134 n.9.
64. Id. at 882 n.6, 538 P.2d at 260 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132 n.6.
65. Id. at 883, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
66. Id.
67. Arguably such an instruction amounts to an implicit charge on the nature of the crime
since the line between the nature of the crime and the nature of the evidence is at best a
tenuous one. The observation that a "charge is easily made and defended against with
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suspicion and thus invades the jury's exclusive province.
The problem with the traditional instruction is that it has come
to be associated with particular crimes at the expense of forgetting
its essence as a credibility instruction. The purpose of the instruc-
tion is to protect defendants from malicious and fabricated
accusations of criminal sexual conduct."8 In some jurisdictions use
of the instruction is inconsistent with the role of the trial judge and
the requirement of corroboration to convict.
Since the instruction necessarily involves judicial comment on
facts (general or specific) and credibility, only those jurisdictions
which permit the trial court such latitude should use the instruc-
tion. Those which confine the judge to no more than stating the law
advance a policy of judicial restraint to insure the jury's exclusive
fact finding role, and therefore should shun the instruction. Those
favoring judicial comment on evidence maintain that the judge's
observation of numerous witnesses accentuates his insight into truth
telling. Together with his knowledge of the law and indifferent posi-
tion vis-a-vis the parties, this insight equips him to be the most
qualified of the lawyers present at trial to assist and guide the jury. "9
The purpose of permitting judicial comment on the evidence is to
assist the jury by clarifying issues and focusing attention on the
crucial aspects of the case.7
A corroboration requirement for conviction of a particular crime
promotes a policy identical to that of the cautionary instruc-
tion7 -to protect the defendant from concocted charges. Use of a
cautionary instruction, either the conventional one or the kind sug-
gested in Rincon-Pineda,72 in a jurisdiction which requires corrobor-
ation is duplicative and could serve more to confound the jury than
to enlighten it. If the corroboration requirement for rape, for exam-
difficulty" is only a step removed from the remark that "the two parties are usually the only
witnesses to the act" which is a frequent characterization of the crime of rape. Thus a general
nature of the evidence comment is really a description of how the crime usually occurs.
68. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 874-75, 538 P.2d 247, 254-55, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 126-27 (1975).
69. A.B.A. Comm. of the Section of Judicial Admin., Instructions to Jurors, reprinted in
10 F.R.D. 409, 412 (1951).
70. Id.
71. See, Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J.
1365, 1373-84 (1972).
72. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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ple, is satisfied, then an instruction casting suspicion on the prose-
cutrix's credibility is counterproductive. The danger of duplication
exists also where there is no corroboration requirement, but the
cautionary instruction is mandatory and the prosecution has intro-
duced evidence corroborating the complaint. Where sufficient corro-
boration has been presented, whether required or not, the
cautionary instruction should not be given.
Thus, from a policy perspective, the cautionary instruction
should be employed only by jurisdictions which allow the trial court
to comment on evidence and credibility, and then only when there
has been insubstantial or no corroboration of the complaint. If the
wisdom implicit in Rincon-Pineda is perceived and followed, judges
would charge caution only in terms of specific evidence, recognizing
that. the general comment, either on -the "character of the crime"
or the "nature of the evidence," usurps the jury's role. By
abandoning the rule of mandatory application and requiring that
the prescription of caution be linked to comment on specific evi-
dence, Rincon-Pineda establishes a salutary rule for the California
courts.
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